where did the term cloud computing come from? >> guest: i actually don't know the origin of it. i think it is meant to evoke the idea that your data are out there somewhere and you may not know exactly where physically the data is located. as far as you are concerned you have seen e-mail service which is available to you on your bubble device where you are right now. but as to where the data actually lives, which state or even country it is and you might not know. this is kind of out there. up in the clouds. >> host: edward felten, thanks for spending a few minutes on "the communicators." >> guest: my pleasure. >> to watch these are regular interviews go toward communiqués web site at c-span.org.

last week mohamed el-baradei return to egypt as the country faced antigovernment protest and call for president hosni mubarak to resign. mr. el-baradei served as the director general of the international atomic energy agency, the un's nuclear energy watchdog program. last year he spoke at harvard university about egypt's future and global nuclear policy. this is an hour and 20 minutes. >> one of the continually great leaders of his generation. people here remember gilbert and

sullivan's line about the very model of the modern public, of a modern major general and i will celebrate tonight the very model of a modern international public servant. there are so many things to say about mohamed el-baradei. i made my list of 100 but that would take up all the time so i'm going to empathize just three and the three that i think are directly relevant to students in the school as they think about their own careers. verse, dr. el-baradei is an egyptian, very proud egyptian. he was educated initially in cairo. he got his doctorate at -- and international law at nyu. we entered the egyptian foreign service and served with distinction. secondly, mohamed is the only person ever to be elected for a third term as the director

general of the iaea, the international atomic energy agency, which is the principle international agency responsible for dealing with all things nuclear. for his performance in that role, he was awarded with the iaea, the nobel peace prize in 2005, in which the nobel committee judged his work of "and incalculable importance and praised mohamed and the iaea for their "efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used, for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way." third, if you believe what you read in the newspapers, dr. el-baradei may be having a further incarnation as a

champion of democratization in egypt and the arab world. across these many careers, and the careers to come, if i were to try to summarize the attributes that i admire most in this international public servant, i just mentioned for. first, fierce independence. second, third, undaunted courage and forth, a perpetual tickling the side. if you could take those lessons and put them in a bottle, it would be much more successful if we could pass it on but i think these are great lessons for students as they think about their own careers. what we are going to do tonight at dr. el-baradei's suggestion is to have a conversation.

he and i converse as frequently as he and i have the opportunity but he said rather than giving a speech maybe i will try to ask in him the questions that i think are most on people's minds but after we have talked for a little bit we will go to the audience for questions from the audience. but let me start with here is we take director general el-baradeb right up until the beginning of this year over the previous 12 years. he was both a player of the international communities and also a first-hand observer of the resolution or the failure to resolve relations with three countries that president bush in january of 2000 -- 2002 in the state of the union announced as the axis of evil.

do remember there were three -- iraq, iran and north korea. well, 12 years later, there is iraq, iran and north korea so i want to ask a question about each and get mohamed to tell us a little bit about his own reflection. now there are so many things to say about the iraq story, but i'm going to just try to focus on one. the business proposition i mentioned before a fierce independence, the u.s. government or specifically the bush administration was arguing that saddam hussein had weapons of mass destruction and specifically nuclear weapons, so secretary or vice president cheney focused on iranian nuclear weapons as the premise

as the u.s. going to war. when this question came to the authorities, the experts, the iaea, and to its director general, he said, and here is january 2 of 2003 report to the u.n. security council, dr. el-baradei wrote no evidence that iraq has revised its nuclear weapon program since the elimination of that program in the 1990s and two, from our analysis to date, it appears that the aluminum tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by iraq and less significantly modified would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges. for standing up for his views, he became i would say on the short enemy list of some and the

u.s. government. indeed, that was the beginning of a long story, but i told him at the time and i have told him afterwards, basically he was putting himself and the iaea on the line, standing up against the world's sole superpower over an issue about which he was about to go to war. so tell us a little bit about that. >> thank you for your embarrassing -- and i can't tell you how much pleasure i have to be with you. it is a great opportunity for us to interact and reflect on some of that -- major issues facing humanity which is primarily

related in my perspectives geraghty and cooperation in economic development and in other words how we can live together as one human family and to me, war is a course which indicates failure of human beings to resolve their issues in a peaceful manner. you don't take decisions to go to war unless in my view it is the last remaining option and the best option available and in the case of iraq, as you know, saddam hussein had a clandestine nuclear program which we discovered accidentally in 1991 because we didn't have the legal authority to go there. we neutralize the program. iraq was pretty much -- by 1997 and from any nuclear weapons related activities.

we were out for four years. we were asked to go back in 2002, in november 2002, with what i called authority. we had the security council resolution that we could do anything, anytime anywhere and it is something that would never happen again as far as i'm concerned. we sent our people who were aware of what was going on in iraq before. we had a lot of experience and we massaged every possible -- and attribute scientist. we looked at satellites and used every technique available, and we haven't seen an iota of an indication that iraq had a nuclear weapons probe prague ran. there was of course a lot of hype if you remember.

part of that in public discourse when vice president cheney asked about that and he said frankly i think mr. elbaradei was wrong and he went through litany of how the agency missed a lot of activities. however, this was a decision which, or a statement which i did not take lightly because i know the impact of that and i know that when there is judgment of the country, if your statement would lead to war, you have to go through a lot of -- and look at every evidence available and as i said there wasn't any indication that iraq had reconstituted his weapons.

i went to the security council and number of times. i said we hadn't yet at that time completed our inspection. in fact, a few days before the war, i repeated that statement in march and i said i needed a few months which will be what i called an investment in peace because it would avoid the war. the u.s. joined by the way cave. that iraq was absolutely clear of any weapons of mass destruction. by but worse than that of course, if you look at iraq today, there are 1 million people that have lost their

lives comments commonsense civilians and i think i'm quoting again to the cnn. there were 3 million people who have been maimed as a result of the war and 4 million have been displaced internally and externally so one out of three iraqis have been -- for a war that was launched on the wrong assumption and now they tell us that while it was not come even if there were no weapons of mass ejection as was indicated still the war was justified because of regime change and saddam hussein was a horrible dictator. yes saddam hussein was a horrible dictator but was that the price to pay? pulverizing a country because he they dictator was in power and we have many of them around the world. and i asked the question, is regime change part of international law? where an international law do you find in the a letter or use

of force to change a regime sanctioned by international law and if not, who was accountable for that? that is a question i think is not going to go away very easily. somebody has to be accountable for the loss of life that we have seen on iraq and someone has to be accountable in my view it is a breach of international law. >> let me take you to iran for a second because we were talking about this earlier today. your proposition is that watching the last 10 years in iran. at the u.s. had played its hand with more agility and more imagination, that we would have in iran today that actually did not stand anywhere close to having a nuclear weapons capability, that a deal could have been reached earlier at

simple junctures as you are saying in which i rant would have stopped its enrichment activity with just a research and development version but i think you said the russians have proposed 31 or somebody had proposed all 100. so this is a big proposition and here we are with one of the greatest challenges that we face today in which iran on its current trajectory -- well today has two bombs worth of uranium enrichment. it has 4000 centrifuges spinning then we didn't have to be here. we could have stopped some earlier point if we had played the hand differently so tell us, what were the best opportunities we have been blighted we make the mistakes that we did if we did? >> diplomacy to me as i'm i am sure to you is not when you

engage in diplomacy. you have to understand where you are at first it is coming from. you have to understand their psychology, their insecurity and you have to understand that to make a difference between a question that raises concerns, and their different remedies to different situations. i ran, as i have come to see the development there, like iran, these are like the north square. there are missed opportunities in many ways. to start with, once you start calling names by biblical terms you were not really interested in finding a pragmatic practical down to her solution. and in iran, iran could have started the probe graham for weapons purposes in the mid-80s, during the war with their back when chemical weapons were used against iraq. however, i think i ran later on

it if you want to be denied as a division of power, you need to have either a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons capabilities and nuclear weapons capabilities is kosher under the non-corporation treaty, one of the deficiencies in my view of that non-proliferation treaty and that is what they have tried to do. they went underground and of course they were in violation to extend of their obligation to imported -- but the argument, not defending them but the argument that if we would have gone aboveboard we would have gotten zero because they weren't essential for many years. every member during even the clinton administration going around the globe saying ivan should not get even a power reactor because they should not he can get the knowledge about nuclear because they are a country not to be trusted. in that situation, and iran

decided that we have got to get the technology. they went underground. they made a deal with the network which was later discovered under the so-called a.q. khan network, and then, the then they were called if you would like red-handed by agencies that we have come to discover that they have been developing an engagement capability. at that time it was very laboratory scale when i was there in april 2003. was still at the very experimental stage, and they have course there was a lot of outcry from the west west and from the u.s.. you know, this again is the rules. this is illegal and you have to stop that as a matter of

confidence building until we find out a solution and establish confidence in the peaceful nature. they were ready to suspend their program. they suspended in fact the enrichment program for over a year. for them, as i mentioned, as i read it at least, the nuclear program, coming to still live, and means to an ad. they want to be recognized as a regional power, as an imported region of power. they have no problem with the u.s. is a global power but we need to recognize there were 50 years of grievances between them and the u.s. and nato members in 1953 when the cia and am i 6, government at first nationally elected government, then we have to go through the -- of 79 so lots of reasons to send human rights issues what have you.

they wanted to be recognized. they saw that to be an engagement program or the ability to develop a weapon in a short span of time if they would like to do so. they however agreed that if the west were ready to address their concerns or their security sanction what have you that suspend the program and they did suspend the program. at that time the u.s. was absolutely not ready to talk to them. there was a number of, a number of messages that went from the iranian government to the u.s. bush administration saying ready to discuss everything, ready to engage you. you know, we are ready to sit around the table with you and talk about whatever we can do to build confidence. the answer at that time, the answer at that time was we are not ready to talk to you because

as you mentioned, you are part of the axis of evil as we mentioned. negotiations are a reward for good behavior and not a tool to change behavior and that is where the fundamental difference i have with the con -- diplomacy. you deal with adversity to change behavior in not to way to behave before you talk to them. however, that was the ideology at the time and the europeans, the europeans did engage, did engage with iran and in fact, one of the senior european responsible for the negotiation at that time again was the position of the u.s. told me that we are acting as human shields, you know that we are engaging iran because we do not want to see another iraq in fact. however, for the europeans to

succeed they needed the support of the u.s. and iranians were negotiating with europe looking behind her shoulders to the americans because they know the ones who can do the heavy lifting are the u.s.. they wanted as a litmus test a nuclear power reactor. they could not get that because the only one that could have provided that was a french company called a rebuff. it is the largest market in the u.s. and they could not get the rain might from the u.s. so they came to iran with what i call an empty shell, an empty offer, basically waffling and saying we are going to open our market for you with language. as i mentioned you a paragraph in that saying he'd know when you stop your enrichment they will take care of your scientists who are going to be redundant. the iranians realize that this was not the way to go, that the

best way to do it is to go through a change of government, the so-called moderate government and in the new government decides to go and establish on the ground and start a conversion and start to build enrichment programs. however, throughout this time, they were still ready for engagement. they were still ready to engage with the u.s.. they were still ready to suspend but of course at that time, they had to have a face-saving because the nuclear issue had to calm a matter of national pride. every iranian and his brother with no but enrichment is about because it came a matter of you know, an indication of science and technology, progress would have you. there were a number of proposals put on the table at that time, including the one you mentioned by russia, which is limiting the iranian program to the r&d

stage. another one was a proposal i to the swiss who did a lot of work again to limit it to a few hundred. these were all rejected, you know and the u.s. policy at that time, forcing at least that iran should not spend one single centrifuge and let us wait iran will buckle under pressure. that is what the u.s. policy was four years. eventually a change he sang all right we are going to join when iran started to develop capacity and when they realize the policy was not working and that when iran is not buckling under pressure and when -- is in charge in iran than they change and set all right we are ready to join the europeans which is a good offer. now the second offer was much more courteous language, much more substantive and what they are offering but they said for you to get these goodies you

have to stop all your enrichment activities before the negotiations. anybody would have realized immediately that this is not the way you negotiate. i mean, you get that as an outcome of negotiation and not as a -- and of course the iranians at that time are not ready to give the fruits of the negotiations before you start the negotiations. and it was, it was immediately apparent to me that -- i had a number of discussions at the state department with condi rice and others, basically saying to me you know for iran to have a laboratory scale enrichment for, and they needed that for domestic purpose because they couldn't go to their people and say we stop completely our program. in return for a brand to apply apply -- giving the agency much more authority to inspect iran's possible activities were my

chamorro port and. because my worry and continue at that time to be not really that the declared activities and i brand inspection 24/7 but basically the possibility of undeclared activities and i needed that tool to do that inspection. i ran at the beginning again, when they suspended the program applied the additional protocol and the rape of two go places. when they were taken to the security council, you know that of course all of that came to a hault. they stop the implementation of that protocol. they accelerated their enrichment prague remained rather than buckling under pressure they started to go into a confrontation mode. today, what we see is iran of course mastered the technology which again i should say the basic objective and 2003 of the u.s. and the europeans but

primarily the u.s. that iran should not have the technology, the know-how which to me again was something offensive frankly to think that a country would not have even the knowledge. it is not doable and it smacks of even arrogance. however, iran now, as they look back, they have been burning, spinning centrifuges for 60 years and they have now enough material that is raising some concern. they know how to go about enrichment and finally, when obama, president obama came to power he realized that this is iran's policy and if you really want to engage every and you need to engage iran on the basis of respect and that is what he said and without preconditions. unfortunately, by the time obama came to power the reigning government were embroiled in their own domestic situation and

we are going through what i believe until now is a situation inside of iran that while you have the president was ready to engage, that former national security adviser and even the so-called moderate by doing anything bad can impact on the full freedom to manage their program. there was in the last six montht produces isotope for medical purpose, for cancer treatment and other and we thought that this was a golden opportunity to show goodwill on both sides. and iran agreed that they will use their own enriched uranium to be used for manufacturing and that was perfect because once you get that fuel out of iran or use it for fuel, that would defuse the crisis and diffuse

all the cries that iran might have a big scenario and leave the non-proliferation treaty. obama was very excited about that because again present obama realize realized that this would give him the space that he needed to negotiate with iran on the whole range of issues. unfortunately, that proposal got stuck on sequencing. iran said we are ready to ship our -- out of the country when they got the fuel. the u.s. and europeans said no you first have to ship ship it out and you will get the fuel in two years because it takes time to develop the. >> so mohamed, here let's imagine you parachute in. here we have the americans and americans and europeans. right now, and we have the iranians. you are one of the few people that have talked to everybody so you have talked to ahmadinejad, my goodness, many many others.

you talk to the supreme leader. you have talked to obama. so how hard is it for you to make this deal? is there a deal here to make ours a two-way? >> i think the idea that, and again i am not getting into the habit that. i think it's still is a deal to be made. once the iranians are ready to get this into the persian gulf under custody is. that is what i propose to them. we will put it into a warehouse, completely secured by her security guards and that frankly toomey will eliminate almost 100% of the threat it has they could not use it in any way for any enrichment or weapons related purposes.

.. they never had that they can have something very positive in iraq come in the case of afghanistan, in the case of the city of lebanon. and so, to me, the precursor to

a sooner or later is going to happen, comprehensive negotiations is a win-win situation. >> even now. >> even now it is not what you need, what you want 100%. but it satisfies the needs by eliminating the ac. it allows iran to be able to say we finally got a goodwill from the u.s. in the negotiation. so i hope people will just be patient. it's a surprise to see the inherent value of that offer and the implication of going there, too. to go to the sanctions hurt, again, an act of desperation. i never believe the sanctions would resolve an issue.

sanction is beyond -- enriches the people as we have seen. sanction was designed in 1945 to apply to a democratic society. when people are getting hurt to go to the government. have no impact on the government. and that to me -- i think i may probably have go through and show you are doing something. and maybe that's going to happen, but i hope immediately afterward, you try to see how you engage iraq. engaging iran on the nuclear issue is under attack. security and gradually trying to put issues on the table and trying to win confidence

building measures. unless that what happened, we would continue to get the source. there is concern about tehran, but i haven't seen anybody seen that will wake up tomorrow and have iran with a nuclear weapon. up until today they stop any weaponization. in 2003, all the estimation and all the time to protect debris in an irrational way and understand the implication, resulting in one immediately set by violence, radicalization, but in my judgment than separately. so i hope -- as i said, i hope somebody would look at the possibilities -- at the positive can see the glass half full and not have half-empty.

even in iraq, again, you cannot concern but you cannot overstate. iran could be a city of concern. the hypothesis in the future part of the npt and developing new rear questions, one or two. but you live in a world where you have 20,000 nuclear weapons. and you have to put that into it. you live in a world where you have nuclear weapons. i matter what you buy your second shot policy. i look at north korea. i look at iran. it's an indication to me that everybody knew it including the bush admin is nation because they believe that nuclear weapons. they would not sell right about punching the borders. in the case of north korea with

kim jong-il two is not the greatest democrat in the world, people are saying the emphasis in on the are gentlemen and finding a solution based on the property, negotiation. this is the reality. you know, you can say whatever you want to say. people are not to see that if you have nuclear weapons or if you have even the capability as iran is trying to do now, then it differently. there are countries no matter what or privileged countries. they have nuclear reference or 13 countries live under the nuclear umbrella, which means that the nuclear weapons does matter and we are protect it at this nuclear umbrella. what to tell the other 160

countries that, you know, if you cannot touch a nuclear weapon or umbrella because you cannot have a security concern. but any policy, as we were discussing today, any policy which is not equitable is not sustainable. so either to ever change of mindset and accept the security system that's on equitable sustainable or continue with the message that we can't have nuclear weapons. with the natives cannot. unfortunately if you continue down and the policy of john f. kennedy with the nuclear weapons states will come through and of course using nuclear weapons because of system failure is much, much higher. even worse, as you and i have been talking, the possibility is

getting nuclear weapons or materials. for them the so-called deterrence. it's not relevant to their ideology. they are they are to talk about iran or north korea. no matter what you call, the outliers, axis of evil, there is a certain conception. so my worry is 10 times more with an extremist group getting over the nuclear weapons. and with the nuclear weapons there is to to know about the material is not properly secured. the risk of me to focus much, much more is the possibility of making sure i do claim the phrase, applying the gold standard to nuclear weapon mechanism. >> let me do one more question in him will go to the audience.

i know on many peoples -- which are mainly talking about national security, but many people also have another question in mind. so what about egypt? [laughter] >> well, i think -- since i was out of office i'm looking for something to do -- [laughter] i can guarantee one thing, that having known and admired all hominid in his wife greatly for many, many years, his wife who almost divorced him when he did the third term as director of iaea has sweated and bled the commitment that he was going to retire when he left the iaea and going to meet his granddaughter who is two years old and spent some time together in a very nice house in the south of

france. and maybe come and visit us from time to time. i would need an expensive work plan. >> well, i always believed that coming in now, an existence that is not empowering people is going to add. and i've seen them integrating. there's at least four or five civil wars and people are, you know, people in the world are depressed by their own government from the outside world and they are right on board. ecus kittanning killed in every way. it aired, the muslims. even on government he cannot have freedom of speech. and this is to me, as i saw it, even from being in egypt, most of the time, is that it's

combination of extremists. you know, people lose hope when people are humiliated. i mean, that is the absolute recipe for being radical. as i always say, people are a result of their own environment. you will not get that unless you create involvement when people see they are treated with dignity and pride and the ability to speak their minds. unlike any other democracy, that is not happening in the arab world. egypt is the precursor, in my view of mark kennedy. so i have been for the last three months same egypt needs to make a move, you know, for authoritarian system who has been going on for 58 years to a

democracy. foreign people are the only way to move forward another major impact and engage against the world on the global issues with climate change and nuclear security to arms control. the fire, you know, this to me is inevitable. in the world particularly after the cold war when you have everybody and his brother become a democracy, we need to get them out and join the crew. i must continue to live in a system that is the function it in my view. and this stability is based in a regime that is supported, i'm not a regime supported. i have been for the last few months growing for peaceful change in egypt, making people understand the language between democracy and economic and

social progress. i have been -- you've been vilified or the bush administration, but that was child's play. i'm getting now we need to, but i would continue to speak my mind. i believe this is inevitable course of action and i'm still quite hopeful that basic freedom -- you cannot deny people basic freedoms. and this is -- if you want people to act like human beings, you have to see them as human beings. [applause] >> there are microphones -- the enough at the microphones right here. the microphones on the ground floor please line up and also in the mergers here.

as giovanna spares. this one second. let me make only one small correction. i don't know exactly about the egyptian politics, but for the americans here, i will remind you that when the question arose of who should become direct your -- you should be director of iaea, this is back in 2004 or five -- it was 2004 or five -- yeah, five, john voelker who is the undersecretary of state and made it his cause to prevent mohammed a very serving in the third turn. chief of staff has talked about

this later in terms of a genuine conspiracy. and i said to mohammed at the time that this was one of the most exercises of enlisting unwitting agent who enhanced his credibility in the world beyond belief because having opposed him so viciously only made his standing improves steadily through this effort. while john didn't know what he was doing, he was actually the most effective unwitting agent you ever saw. so maybe this could have the same effect. >> the same thing is happening in egypt. >> exactly. this gentleman. the rows are we have only one speaker tonight. he is dr. of our day -- mohamed elbaradei. >> i am an egyptian and i have

lived in massachusetts for the last 30 years. what are the chances on a scale of one to 10 megabits and next president to be just mobley two for economics road construction and other things. what are your top four or five priorities and was your chance on a scale of one to 10 to become the next president of egypt. [laughter] >> i told you there's three questions. you can answer any questions you want. >> my wife hopes that the chances are zero. i frankly do not know. and that's not my worry. my concern is to be an agent for change. i mean, whether it be president of egypt is totally immaterial for me. the issue is to a system by which people of their right to choose whoever they think is the right person for that job.

and the question -- the other question you ask, what is my priority? my priority is democracy. people don't understand if it's a democratic system, or which are talking about in terms of economic, education, whatever. democracy means that you are not in the people that are the best. you're able to have an independent judiciary. you are able to have independent department or congress. if people fail you, then you have a change of power. so empowering the people means that they will focus on their priorities, the priorities of people. it's medicare, social security, what have you. if i were drafting anybody, the major focus as i said in my twitter and have now been asked about, i am now a technology

savvy person in my old age. i have said it's democracy. >> will go to the first row cheer. he's an assistant professor at the kennedy school. introduce yourself. the nike is such a good job, graham. hh middle east politics among other things. thank you very much for coming to harvard today. and many of your public talks eagerly emphasize the chernobyl interested in being the president of egypt. which are interested in is being an agent of change. energy last night speaking to the egyptian american community saying egyptians and americans need to go through the process of change to become democratic essence. talk to me baby correct, but it's not the kind of thing you see politicians say. politicians generally cater to their audiences and tell them

how wonderful they are, that her. these are all simple to me when you are serious when you are not interested in being the president of egypt. why do they get is that so many churches are willing to take you at your word? >> well, i guess you live in boston. i live in egypt now i am not interested. i said that is not my priority. and i think i'm getting moral stability by focusing on the need for change and not on the personal agenda. they made it very clear, you know, if there were to be a change we made that necessary move towards democracy and if people want me to run, i will not let them down. i never said i will never run for president, but i'm not saying this is my primary goal. my primary goal is to be a democratic agent, but it seems to her because i've got

sovereignty on my facebook. last night's >> okay, the gentleman in the lounge, please introduce yourself. not any miss richard solomon, i'm a citizen of boston and thus the world. when i go to sleep a night i thank you personally for the work you've done over the years to produce nuclear weapons and control them in this planet. what i want to ask you about is the recent agreement with president obama and president medvedev to reduce nuclear weapons. i have a suspicion that it may not be as productive as it appears on the surface that these nations that have thousands upon thousands of overkill are simply reducing weapons they have to take out of circle anyways and replace them with et cetera, et cetera.

so is there reason to be optimistic about the major countries to control nuclear weapons, reducing the amounts of the world? or is more work needed to be done on india and pakistan? and should the world that has nuclear weapons or just nuclear capabilities like france provide nuclear power two countries to reduce their dependency on costs on petroleum and a safe and controlled manner? what is your thoughts on that? >> well, u.s.a. number of questions. they think on the new start i am somewhat disappointed frankly. i would like to see a more progressive process in the number of deployed weapons with talking about 1500 not to be even implemented in seven years to reach that goal. there is not named in the agreement about the deployed

weapons, thousands of nuclear warheads, that are not deployed or say that they should be eliminated. the rigorous status alert is going to be here next week and he will tell you this is not sustainable. it is not logical. 20 years after the cold war you still have weapons in russia in a way that does not give humans the ability to think about whether to retaliate a deported nuclear attack. so that could have sent a better message if there were, you know, provision about eliminating the undeployed nuclear weapons, if there was more deployed nuclear weapons and about changing the

deployment status to take account at the end of the cold war. and that would've been sending a different message. the message coming from some, yeah, is that we are victors into moving along with president obama, but with a long, long way to go. it doesn't need to change environment. it doesn't have the french of the world and everybody continues to develop nuclear weapons capability or nuclear weapons. i asked this question today. why, britain -- u.k., why they are buying submarines? why does the u.k. big nuclear weapons? ways the u.k. different from germany, spain or italy? they rendered the nuclear umbrella. what message are you sending? are sending a message that nuclear weapons is a status

symbol and not should not be the area of tension. either go for the nuclear weapons are go for the nuclear weapons capability. and that is something i worry about right now. you might be not developing nuclear weapons, but go all the way. show us developing nuclear weapons and everybody knows you can have nuclear weapons in a couple weeks. that's the security margin that comes to my mind. there is a called managing and i said i should call up mismanaging with the way we should. i think what we are saying is right. i think we need to change our approach to the whole way. you can provide people, but you

can reduce drastically the possibility that having multinational approach through the fuel cycle. so no one will have an abridgment fact very. these will be in a number of countries that would be keeping an eye on each other. that to me is the way to the future. but having every country now saying that we can have the facility, you would end up, you know, basically was 20, 25 countries who have nuclear weapons capabilities, which in me doesn't make much difference. but you need to look at 50 years after the first react as and see how you balance.

in other words, maximize the benefits of nuclear energy. is the least we can do to minimize the risk, multinational approach to safety systems, binding inspections -- a better inspection mechanism and ability for watchdog. we will continue to be the watchdog if you don't have the labor authority, if a materialize on those who have in the trees sometimes they are, sometimes now. we will continue to have to rely on land. so we don't really have an iaea independence and credibility we have. you're talking about an area where one error could lead to

our world being wiped out. and then the argument i used to get is that this is too expensive, we cannot afford it. and as i mentioned, our budget for verifying the world, $900 million in the case of iraq, they mentioned, when you went for a second -- the americans went for a second visit to iraq, that's her budget for 30 years. so we need money, commodity, resources. i left it for 2020 and they came with fantastic accommodations. we sent the report to government and i think by 2050 would give primary response. >> we are 20 questions that only 15 minutes.

so we have to quick questions and quick answers. >> my name is ali carter and i am a professor. i had the privilege of getting yesterday's meeting. i share.your elbaradei's interest in democracy. i like his focus and ideas so much. however, as i think i explained yesterday, this will be addressed to the literate people in egypt and not -- will not be well understood by the patients, the workers, the most illiterate people and they are the majority in egypt. the second point was running for

the presidency. mr. hosni mubarak is not going to run for the fourth. will need a special address -- special percussions against the common case in egypt for the most hundred years ago, which was almost the privilege of the military. this was -- >> it to your question, please, quickly. >> okay. that started with mohamed najiv, the first president of egypt, --

they are all military and they all make sure to work in the first steps where they have to convince the people of their power. >> thank you. >> i was prepared today to answer more questions on the mobility because that is. i should answer that but of course you speak a different language to different people. i was just mentioning today that they have reconciled people. i talk to them any jet about music, about jazz as they were absolutely excited and they supported a. we should try to underestimate them. however, if the question of, as i said, going through that as a

black hole because it is not a level playing field. i get lots of advice. i don't know how it is going to be, but that i think -- >> yes, sir, please. introduce yourself. >> and amos karimov arrived. the iaea are state there's to the npt, but the current threat is nuclear terrorism. so what should and can't iaea do to prevent nuclear terrorism. should the iaea invoked action to inspections. >> we are spending a lot of the assessment. the problem we have is the lack of resources.

we still need a lot of resources. we know there's a lot of material that's not adequately protect it today. the more resources to get them at the more to resource the material. we should aim for in a 40 year term 12 nuclear security, to secure all nuclear security in 40 years. people should put their money where their mouth is. i mean, i've seen that so many times. get lots of lofty declaration so that goes back to the treasury. i mean, we know what to do. we can do it. >> this gentleman. >> hi, i'm an arab-american. thank you for your time. i'll add you to my face the. to think iran's intention to double up a nuclear bombs has acted as a deterrent for further escalations? or would've stopped his dribble

from attacking iranian nuclear sites like they did in iraq and syria quakes do think the fact that they want to build nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent and therefore actually prevented all the wars from taking place? >> well, i'm not sure they have. i don't think they have nuclear weapons today. i don't think you can talk about the iranian deterrence. i think what iranians have done is raised concern about the whole stability or instability and concern about the israeli program for the nuclear program were there outside the whole machine. they talk about the insecurity and instability. he raises concern about domestic policies in different countries and the depression of the

republic. that issue is not susceptible in any way for any use of force. if you do that, that would go for a crash course. if you're not going for nuclear weapons today, it was the force of all of the people around the world. so all the solutions are to bring it down. and it doesn't have -- it doesn't need to direct two of more interest. i mean, do you have what you and i call soft power in all the countries around it and in the city of lebanon and afghanistan. for the nuclear -- as i said, the nuclear program is sending unmanned and manned is to ensure that they are a major player that you have to contend with. i'm not sure that they have developed a concern about this,

but i think the concern is somewhat overstated and i also think the solution is not using extension of force, but trying to find a way to get together. >> my name is flip shooter, at the kennedy school. you mention in your talk and you mention iran and the relations. had you bring in russia about teeny-weeny nuclear program to bring into better success? >> well, they are fair, but primarily having the iranian issue -- i mean, you have your pm, you have russia and chinese, but everybody understands it will not come from the u.n.

because they are the ones who can provide the security assurance if you like. they are the one who is able to provide tech elegy amnesty agreement and what have you. could become the first beneficiary of iran acting as stabilizing forward in iraq and afghanistan and the palestinian authority. so no matter how you look at a forces the u.s. in iraq when these two countries get together, support by russia, that's all fine and not part of the process. but nobody has any allusion that it has to do the fabulous team. >> gentleman. >> at evening, gentlemen. my name is dave pascale, a fellow here at the college.

i'd like to talk about on the program moving towards a nuclear free world. it doesn't seem like a bit of the situation. it seems like you would be destabilizing to vent, meaning the arms reduction talks. so even if we reduce the arsenal to 25%, we still have the opportunity to destroy the world to times over. like you to talk about what we're getting into the import times when we actually a 100 nuclear weapons, 50, 10, even zero to renege on and what d.c. have been into this world world where one nuclear weapon changes the entire power? it seems to me very unstable. i like the world worse and that's a great situation to return to. and what seems to be an unstable situation. >> in an unstable if we have nuclear situations.

>> we have one to 10 to 100 with incentives to achieve by necessary. >> we have both arsenals, if russia was cheated -- >> this is a question that we discussed today. we all realize that the current situation today is not sustainable in many ways because the world is not going to be limited to my nuclear weapons. if you continue down this path can you continue to have 10, 20, 15 nuclear weapons. again, the possibility of a nuclear weapon, accidentally even is much higher with the number who have nuclear weapons. so to get people, george shultz,

you know, talking about nuclear weapons, you have to understand that this situation, particularly today is a situation that you need to change. we would like to go to zero. were not going to zero overnight, but what would be the reason to have two argue we could have 20,000 warheads today, 20 some years outside the cold war. when we come to 50 or 100, sure we need to have an alternative security. we talked about today how to make sure that what happens when there are no nuclear weapons and yet every country stays stable. have russia for example would be assured you are not going to use your superior convention is capability, you know, to your advantage. there's a lot of work that needs to be done.

the work is not being done today. we all talk about global zero, but i suggest this fascinating area, you know, how could we have the new security paradigm? i don't think, you know, we always were children to leave them to a world that the only way we can secure is to have weapons that if one of home were to launch, the world as we know it would change differently. you can advise unconventional weapons, but it's a question of security. i mean, security is a very difficult issue. are you secured when you have 2 billion people living on $2 a day? very secure when you have conflicts in kashmir and the palestinian issues that have been going on for 60, 70 years? are you secured when you are

liable in many ways dysfunctional and you cannot rely on the results of many of these issues. security is not just a weapon because it's an environment when people go to work or to attack each other. the senate 27th century now. they don't see eye to eye. other problems. you'll never think they'll go to war against each other between them and it is unthinkable to think of anyone attacking each other. can you extend this to the european union to be more fragile? it's a different country, a different regime.

we need to think about an alternative security system. the world would be unstable if we did not take care. i think henry kissinger taught about built-in mechanisms to detect and deter. so there's a lot of work kept on for you here at kennedy school of many other academic institutions is the one for global zero which will not happen tomorrow. we can live as human beings and not be afraid we are going to wake up tomorrow and half the world's gone. >> i think the challenge is to think about a new security paradigm, especially with someone they'll have to acknowledge. unfortunately my duty to say we're coming close to the end. what i'm going to do is take

one, two, three, each state your question briefly. but mohammed addressed to three and i apologize to the people standing up. >> good evening, ime fellow at the carter center. i attended a talk a couple weeks ago about third. >> decanter you very well. >> i attended a talk at beauford a few weeks ago there was a debate to whether the u.s. should be playing for an attack on wednesday on more than one state in terms of nuclear weapons. it threw me off course because i had in my mind really come there yet. and i walked away thinking, is there a level in the international community some unplanned income if they fire? is their god forbid a nuclear bomb and he doesn't know what to do any citizen level, on the state, level of the international level, simulation workshops where they pick out hot points in the world and think of something happens, what are we going to do?

or is this being left in all of this about nuclear weapons in deterrence. i think it's safe to most people have come to fear. being a citizen of lebanon, i don't see. so if you wish outside all night i'd be grateful. >> good. one question is respect to its bombs went off somewhere, what are we going to do? >> good evening. my name is mohammed and i'm from saudi arabia. my question is, don't you think america and europe just want to maximize iranian case just to cover another experiment of what happened in the tehran area? >> to do what? >> to maximize nuclear weapon, just to cover what is happening and make people just forget what happened around palestine and iraq and focus on iran as the

evil? the >> so i ran to distract attention from iraq or palestine this is the last question. >> hello, madeleine magnusson i'm a student at the college. my question was on your opinion of recycling nuclear fuels and whether the united states should restart recycling nuclear field would outweigh the benefits in terms of undercutting our legitimacy and negotiating with iran. >> my goodness. we are questions. please, just short answers. >> i don't know if we are going to be allies after a nuclear attack. then we'd have to think what to do. but i mean, a lot of countries have not been international system as i know. douceur and horrific possibility

. >> dr. graham, there was a time before that the u.s. was planning for one city or to those are my thoughts on the question and the international level cannot. >> these are students thinking of their thesis topics. [laughter] on the second question of the hiking -- was up for the purpose of destruction? >> i mean, we are on the disparity theory, that there must be another reason behind -- i said there is a hype, but i don't think it has to do with distraction. i mean, these are issues that are there and continue to be fair. it's a question which has to deal with ounce of power between, you know, the perceived threat by iran to and it

primarily. as wife and is taking such a problem here. i think it's hype, but i don't think it's hype that has to do with the balance of power. it's quite unstable. eventually, you know, it has to be read about weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear. but that's a comprehensive peace which i have alluded us in the last 60 years. >> the last question was about recycling. >> well, recycling is -- it's another way of reprocessing. if the u.s. has gone a different way. people argue that if you don't recycle you are losing 95% of the resource, of the uranium. we are not using it. other people say this creates more weapons related material and that that increases the risk of nuclear considered.

i know the recycling was the bush administration. no one at ministration is not we begin the program. a lot of countries on april april 2nd. i mean french, russians -- i think, you know, it has to be under multinational control because it is one of the most sensitive materials that you can use for weapons. so you can use it for electricity, but you have to minimize by making sure at least five or six countries are watching each other. >> let me mention two things that are coming up in continuing this conversation. when were processing the nuclear civilian power in the context of

energies, next monday in the form, john deutch, our colleague from mit will be giving a lecture about energy. and next week on tuesday, a week from tonight at 6:00 here in the forum, sam nunn, who mohammed mentioned, former senator from georgia who is one of the four horsemen and the nuclear threat initiative will be showing us a screening of documentary was none, scholz, kissinger and carry called the nuclear tipping point and there will be a discussion and debate with david sanger who is the nuclear chief correspondent for the leader of times and i don't remember who the third person was. but for the extraordinary service that mohamed elbaradei

has given a fellow citizens in terms of trying to deal with nuclear danger and for whatever his next inclination takes him to, let's say thank you very, very much. [applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> next, you look at the future of pakistan and u.s. policy towards the country. we'll hear from former u.s. massacres to pakistan as well as southeast asia analyst.

the u.s. institute of peace in the brookings is a and a host. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> if we can please all be seated, we biked to begin. good afternoon. thank you all for joining us for today's discussion on the future of pakistan. they also want to welcome those who have joined us on our webcast at usip.org and those following this on television. this event is being cohosted by the brookings institution and

the united states institute of peace. the extreme interest in the subject the timing and criticality of the discussion i hoing this out of the overwhelming response we got when we announced this event. i think it's unprecedented. on and i'm sure we are in for theor legislating and stimulating discussion is that genuine. pakistan of course in the stimug limelight has been for much of the last decade. in and the fact that pakistan's t stability is synonymous with that of south asia and perhaps synonymousbal security is almost clichéd i now.l and i think there is no denyingd the fact that whichever denyg direction pakistan takes, that implication is not only for that region, but definitely for u.s. policy going forward as well. but what is interesting in what well.s thinking about this event is if you really think about itt

it is not much about the future of pakistan that is being discussed, at least not the medium and long-term future. much of what occupies this is the era now,, the dailyre and developments. we pick up the newspaper and see if pakistan still they are or ad not.stan stillhere or that is not unimportant. it takes away from this idea ofi going into the future and see what opportunities pakistan has been what it means to avoid both in the u.s. and pakistaninforme territory. today i think much of the focus is microscopic. this overwhelming sense that we need to get pakistan to deliver on the security front. i think what it does is keep soe just avoided discussing complexities and nuances, which really wants to be studied if you want to see where pakistany

in theded in the medium to long term. m as i said, better knowledge onei the fact that i'll bring pakistan in one direction versus bett the other i really do cry for more informed policy institutions. reqred today's event builds on this idea and built under the recently concluded project by the brookings institution, the brooken cohen, was also my partner in crime in inhosting ts event today. left this project in the futureo ofn pakistan. what came out of that was a collection of scholarly essays called the palacio papers and i believe you have a handout outside of a brief rundown on the project. the project really look at idea of whether pakistan is headedeay and what kind of areas we need variles webout as we look into the future.ok into thfuture it was partially funded by the usip grants program, which asked if they support cannot be in

research and pakistan. once we we're talking about the subject and then he and in the wa systematic research driven medium on the medium to long-term description of pakistan and that is what has brought us hereture today., andt were going to recover three aspects of the afternoon. thre the first panel is going to look at the asvaperiabctless in fact, which will be key in determining what direction pakistan takes. the second panel as well talk pi about pakistan and the stthird will hone in on the policythe implications, both for the u.s.n as well as pakistan itself.e u.. we're very fortunate to have an eminent and distinguished set of here today. pakistanis, as well as americans in both the dish nurse who spens

a lot of time dealing with pakistan in various capacities as practit well as academic expo study this country for years. agpy is ad this country for ye. copyen the bios of the speakers outside but very briefly we are going to have three panels, each will run for a total of 75 minutes, an hour and 15 minutes. the speakers will speak for ten minutes each which should leave us a good half an hour or more for a q&a after every panel, and this is a deliberate choice because we want to make this as inactive as possible. and i'll seek the indulgence of the chairs to ensure that that happens. finally before i invite steve to come and talk briefly about the bellagio project, let me also take this opportunity to thank our team which has worked to make this event possible.

i, for one, actually had very little clue of what was happening. i'm just standing taking the credit here but stephanie flammenbalm, megan from our staff and concertino xavier at brookings, the public affairs team of brookings and u sip, our events management team here as well as the i.t. folks who are making sure that this event is going live on the web, and many us who are not visible but did work to make this happen over the past few weeks. once again, thanks for joining us, and we look forward to very interesting afternoon. steve. >> thank you. this project had its origins in the year or two after i finished my book on the idea of pakistan, and i watched developments in pakistan carefully. i wanted to see whether the prediction in chapter 8 of that

book were coming to what path pakistan was taking, and it -- and as the years went by i realized that many of the warning lights that i had pointed out, many of the warning indicators, were burnt out under the musharraf years. things had gotten from perhaps bad to worse, so i thought pakistan deserves a second look, and this time i thought i would try a methodology which was not another book as such but a tri-partied methodology and some of the foundations were able to help us with this, so this project consisted of three things. the first is a review of past predictions of pakistan and that's contained in the appendix of my own paper, in the back of my own paper, where i look, nic, national intel council, predictions by individuals and others. the second one was my own paper which is available outside, about a 60, 70-page essay about the future of pakistan, and the third, of course, were the bellagio papers, i hope the

rockefeller foundation doesn't mind us using their name, but it was a marvelous setting for an interesting and painful discussion, and as you know from the participants i chose people who were academics, practitioners and think-tankers. i wanted to get a variety of people, young, old, and people who had studied different aspects of pakistan, and i set the agenda for the meeting. it was that i asked each of them to write a short paper, no more than 10, 15 pages, looking ahead, and first i wanted them to write what the factors and variables were which they thought might shape pakistan's future and by future i meant the next five to seven years, medium term, and secondly i wanted them to outline as best they could what that -- that what those futures would look like. what are the most likely futures, least likely futures and i followed the same approach in my own paper which you have the results before you. there's no project conclusion, we're near optimist or pessimists in a sense. we try to analyze the events and the developments in pakistan as

we see them. i was asked to do a summary, i thought we don't need a summary because i can't speak on behalf of the project of the paper-writers. i can only speak on behalf of myself. but clearly, you know, this is a country where there's a lot of pessimism and i used to us >> i used to world for schultz. he told me, hope is not a policy. this was one of my guiding starts. pakistani diplomat said dispair is not a policy either. somewhere between hope and dispair is the reality. not quite sure where. i think the different panelist came out differently. we thought when we organized this meeting, we thought the paper writers with the bilarge owe, and whom the use of the others to talk about.

also, i think it's my task to remind everybody as you leave the meeting, please turn on your cell phones. thank you. >> i guess this is supposed to be off right now. >> let me introduce wendy chamberlain who's going to chair the first session. it's going to be critical as pakistan moves forward. ambassador chamberlain is the president of the middle east institute, a diplomat, she served as u.s. ambassador at various places, including in pakistan in 2001-2002, which as all of you you know was really being in the hot seat. she served on the groups for the american academy of diplomacy, the global head for foundation,

and search for common ground among others. we have detailed bios outside. we keep the bios short. over to you. >> thank you very much. i'd like to say it's my great pleasure in turn to introduce three very distinguished young people who have extraordinary insights into pakistan who will talk about the factors that we'll determine and shape pakistan's future. first ambassador bill milam please join me at the table. ambassador milam had a long career at the state department. she proceeded me in 2002, and left in 2001. bill has remained active in all things pakistan and is a scholar at the wilson center. joshua white. he's a research fellow at the institution for global engagement. he often speaks and writes on

islamic pom -- politics. joshua makes frequent trips. huma yusuf, he's a journalism scholar, for the leading language paper. and she often writes for other important newspapers like "the globe" and "indian express." huma is a graduate of m.i.t. and harvard and she writes on the social issues in pakistan that can get some people in trouble, human rights, honor killings, gang wars, and the governments ineffect prosecution of rape cases. it's not a surprise then that her courage in our reporting has won her a number of awards,

including the pakistan press foundation award for gender and journalism in 2005, and the e.c.'s human rights and journalist in 2006. bill, over to you. >> oh jeez. >> 10 minutes. >> well, thank you. first of all for the young in your introduction. [laughter] >> that i must say was unexpected. but very gratefully received. and the second thing i want to point out to those of you and to the audience in general is that the last time i discussed the issue of the future of pakistan in a group like this was in bellagio. i have to say the setting is somewhat different. it's a bleak subject. but at least at bellagio, every time you look up, you have a postcard view out your window.

here, not much. my job is to talk about, i understand, external variables. they call them factors, i like to call them variables, and their likely impact. i asked myself, like the impact on what? pakistan? yes. in a general sense. but i think we have to think about their impact on certain of the other factors that have things to do with the future of pakistan. so i picked out of the list that i have in my paper, let's see, four really. one, my favorite bug-a-boo which is what i call india sentriesty. it goes along with the india centricity. and three, not just the

assassination of the azir, but the aftermath of the islamist, and in particular, it's seeping into the pores of the pakistan society. last, not necessarily at least, the economy which i think is going to be very important in the short run. now i got to move fast. i'll start with the international economy. which is an external factor. this is going to put great pressure on pakistan in the next few years. certainly this year. food and energy prices are rising. it will probably continue to rise. this puts inflationary pressures into the economy, no matter how you look at it. whether the food prices go up because they are passed through, or because the government subsidizes them and prints money

which also creates inflation. this will be more of a short term factor. but i think the economy and i hope josh will say something about it on the internal side is one the most important things that we're going to be looking at and worrying about in the next few months. the rest of my external factors are basically countries, china. china is a spoiler. it's an easy fallback for pakistan. whenever they hear something they don't like from somebody else, they can turn to china. china gives a lot of trade and aid. probably -- china probably sees pakistan as a way to keep pressure on india, which is it's great rival in asia. and it looks to me as if pakistan -- china is -- would be working against the normalization of relations with india with the pakistanis. and it certainly is not a great

fan of demock thattization either. china is also providing probably a large part of the foreign investment that pakistan receives these days. china doesn't appear to be able to change it's way. if it saw something that pakistan was doing that really threatened it's interest, i would. i don't see a great deal of chance of that. india is the major paradox. it seems to sit on the side and wait and be content to wait for something to happen in pakistan, particularly for pakistan to fall apart. i think it's ambivalent on normal relations with pakistan. and my wonder about india is whether this was a conscious strategy or whether this is just an inability of the democracy to make up it's mind.

but i think india is one of the two major sources if there is one of what i would call a black swan event. some sort of war or other dust up that causes great turmoil in pakistan and perhaps accelerates the process of it's deterioration if it's going to desperate. afghanistan, afghanistan is to my mind an important cog. i say this in my paper, because the -- i think the outcome of the -- what i think it is inevitable political solution there is key to what happens in pakistan. could strengthen the army, could strengthen it's india centricity, it could, a very long shot, give india and pakistan a chance to work together.

>> and, no, no, you are okay. >> okay. thank you. and learn how they could get along before they actually get around to normalizing regularly. finally, the united states. i think probably the united states is an external factor is the most benign of the external factors or external variables. nonetheless, benign has a neutral meaning. i'm not sure that it -- we have a great deal of influence or leverage these days. our great -- our large assistance, if it starts to flow, will be of great help in the time of need. pakistan is becoming more aid-dependent all the time, i think. we have, i believe, finally a welcome conceived strategy for trying to move forward with our relationship. but no one yet believes it. and certainly not in pakistan. i'm not sure too many people in washington believe it yet.

in fact, i believe that part of our problem with pakistan is that there's an enormous division in the -- within the administration as to what the policy should be. and we keep talking out of both sides of our mouth, particularly about afghanistan. you'll notice that the president again talked about july 11, -- july 2011 as the beginning of the drawdown in pakistan. they tried to move that to 2014. that doesn't seem to have penetrated. and it would be very unlikely, i think, that many pakistans don't believe we're going to cut and run again. finally, this is the second source source -- excuse me -- of my -- of black swan possibilities. some sort of real thing that happens in the united states

that would create a public option or clamber for stronger action. i think i probably used up my 10 minutes. >> yeah. thank you very much. if i could ask the other speakers to speak from the podium for the cameras in the back. josh, thank you. go ahead. >> thank you. good to be here today. i was giving the unenviable task to has been the domestic factors that will impact pakistan's future in 10 minutes. the only thing i can promise, it will be thoroughly unsatisfying. i wanted to touch on a couple. first i wanted to talk about the economy, which bill mentions from more of a indigenous point of view, and second to talk about the role of political islam and a few things that we want to consider there to put on the table for our discussion. the economy if you've been

reading the news, you'll know it's pretty grim right now. the good news that pakistan is not on the brink of a balance of payment crisis. we can all smile about that. that might be one the only happy things we hear this afternoon. the bad news that pakistan is close to a fiscal crisis. and you only have to read the headlines in pakistan to know that when pakistan is facing a fiscal crunch, it's very clear what sort of things they cut. they cut development, they cut flood relief, they cut cash transfers to the poor, they cut education, they cut a lot of the things that will be important for any of the mildly rosy to happy long-term futures that we're going to be talking about here today. so over the short term, this looks like questions surrounding is pakistan going to actually implement a reform general sales tax or some other tax regime? is pakistan going to increase the number of people that pay

taxes from about three million out of 175 million to more respectable number? all of those are short term questions that will have an impact over the next few months. as we look at mid and long term, i think there are a few things to consider. the first is that we might say that as long as the united states and pakistan are on a relatively good footing, it's likely the pakistan will keep finding the way to clear the minimum bar necessary to keep the international institutions engaged with pakistan. it's shown a remarkable ability as others have mentioned to negotiate from a position of weakness. to tell the united states and the international community that times are desperate, but if pakistan goes under, it's going to hurt everybody. i would expect as likely they will be able to continue in the vein. i think the real question is whether pakistan can address the

structural problems in it's economy. a lot of them, as i thought about them, are so interrelated to the political economy of pakistan. the fact from the beginning of 1947, land owners have had a prominent role in parliament and every attempt to institute agriculture tax. that industrialist have done similar job trying to thwart any role of energy subsidies of any kind. you have a military that sets it's budget independently, and lets all of the other branches of government sort of fight for the scraps. these are political economy questions. and i think that particularly in a fiscal crisis, all of the political incentives become perverse. if you have looked at the plmn, for the economic agenda, the first one is to roll back the energy subsidies, and fourth one to control inflation. as if these two things are totally different, and there's

no recognition that pakistan has just been monetizing it's fiscal deficit. but all of this on the table, i think we're left with the question which is what could happen to this political thesis in the economic sector? there's a really interesting and voluminous literature on how economic reform happens. it says you have to hit a crisis for the real economic reform to happen. that's the most likely way for economic reform to happen. in that vein, it's interesting to see that some of pakistan's most deep-pocketed alliesing the united states, sowdy -- saudi arabia and that would lead to think there's a likelihood that some kind of crisis could be a catalyst. on the other hand, the fiscal crisis, in my view, is a much less likely kind of crisis than the balance of paymentedly crisis to bring in outside kind of pressures. international community is

likely to go to pakistan, you have 12 different ways of putting your house in order, as opposed to balance of payment where the country is left with very few options. there is, of course, another argument that says that economic reform can best be carried out in an environment of distraction. and there's an argument that's been made and we can debate it, argument made about india's reform in '90s. india was able to implement in the '90s as opposed to the '80s because of the massive public emphasis on conflict, and others have made the argument. that a country that's distracted makes it much easier for a bureaucracy or small elite to move economic reform forward. and that might be something for our conversation as it intersects with the political issues, and i think what we see in this respect is that there's very likely a tradeoff. we see around the world between more democratic and open process of economic reform that's

somewhat perhaps less effective and a more tech any cattic process which can be more effective in the short term which can be painful things like implementing austerity measures. the second issue that i want to talk about is the roll of political islam. there are a lot of issues in talking about political islam that are particularly, i think, unhopeful. the first is will islamic take over the state? and i think it's unhelpful because first of all, political islamist parties don't do very well at the polls. they get most 10 to 15% of the vote. second, they don't have very much capacity for -- to govern a bureaucratic state. i was looking at the shower when the mma islamist alliance was

trying to govern the frontier providence. it was sad and comical, and only every once in a while, hopeful to see the islamist parties try to do education and water delivery and all of the things that governments have to do. third, i think that even when people talk about no longer hypothetical cases of taliban, 60 miles from islamabad, and advances on the capital, one has to ask the very serious question, what on earth are they going to do when they get there? this is a real question in a state that as the large army, proven to be quite resilience. what are taliban from pakistan going to do when they walk down the streets of islamabad? that's not very helpful. the fourth, the military seeing

islamist party and military party as a multiplier. only to a point. we've seen in the last couple of years, the military establishment recognizes these groups are useful, but only in a limited way. to this, i would say the much more interesting question for us to bat around has to do with state incentives for supporting islamic politics or for supporting islamist militancy. even my nationalist pakistani friends will admit the government of pakistan has a long and glorious history of doing this. and there's debate over to what extent the pakistan has rolled back some of it's support for various islamist groups. this depends on what bill was talk about with the threat perception of the region. i think there's also a level of momentum or pass dependence that comes with supporting these kind of militant groups. but all of this is to say, religious radicalism is not simply organic to pakistan, or

pakistani society. it's been supported and cultivated and i think some of the chris fares great survey work shows at least on the demand side for militancy, the government's perspective, and the government's agenda has quite a significant role in shaping people's performances and their views. i'll end with one other question that i think is particularly not helpful in talking about the future of political islam in pakistan. and that is will quote moderate islam triumph over quote radical islam? this has been a question that i think maybe has some very, you know, large scale relevance on some level. particularly in the wake of the assassination, there's the view of the liberal that they are holding down the fort against

the radical hew has -- mu boobi. it's also true who killed the governor was inspired by the radicals. it doesn't take much to look beneath the surface to realize these are liberal on a number of issues. they have a high view of the profit. and all of this to say, we also saw a number of people involved in the lawyers movement who were celebrating in the killings of the governor. these are very uncomfortable facts. they should not have been tremendously surprising. we have set up categories of moderates and radicals, and i think that all of us who have been wondering around pakistan for the last few years have seen that those categories are inadequate. and on some issues you may find they comport very well with america notion of liberalism. they would do well on a faith

panel. there are issues where they do things that shock us that are illiberal. i think the real question is moderates trying to triumph over the liberal? what the discourse and government response to those groups across the board that engage in vigilante islamism? that is groups that decide it's legitimate to do what the state will not do. i believe this needs to be carried out, i can do it even if the state refuses. this is much more interesting. because it comes across the divide between the islam. it cuts across the divide between mainstream and islamist parties. you'll find people in the most liberal parties in pakistan that are debating this question. whether it's legitimate to do what the state will not do. and finally, it cuts across the

class lines and the regional lines as well. so we'll wrap up with that. getting the questions right on islam and futurist lam is important. the last question is how political islam is going to be used in the eyes of the public. >> thank you, josh. >> thank you for having me here. i will talk social and political factors. i'm going to start with the demographic time bomb. pakistan's still going at a 2% rate. according to the mid range, the

population will be 325 million in 2050. this population is young. the median age right now is 21. 2/3 of all pakistanis are under the age of 30 and in 2020s, the 15 to 24 age bracket is expected to swell by over 20%. to ensure that the 18 to 90 million pakistanis who are under the age of 20 find employment in the two decades, the gdp growth has to stand at about 9%. you already heard business mall projects. now this population bomb translating into intense

resource scarcity. by 2025, it is projected to be a scarce country, given that they lack safe drinking water. irrigation practices continue to be wasteful, and it remains to be scene how the floods recovery will proceed to address the issue and the situation has become dire enough that they have taken a part of the water shortages. since 90% of pakistan's water does go into agriculture and immigration, the water scarcity will translate into much more heightened food and security. already we have 77 million pakistani going hungry, 44 million are chronically malnourished. this is a growing tend. food insecure people are the prime target in the recruitment. pakistani analyst have been describing the trend of extremist using the rhetoric of social justice and recruitment of the strengthening of the

marxist nextist. we've seen verses of this occur in 2009 during the taliban takeover. one the first things they did was seize the land possession and promise to redistribute them among the poor. in short, these development indicators, if not addressed, can lead to military extremism and recruitment. there's a flip side to everything. depending on whether or not strong action was taken and economic reforms are implemented, this can be facilitated or offset by pakistan seeing rapid organization in the coming decades. but the 2020s, 50% of all pakistanis will live in cities. and 2025, the number of pakistanis with the population of up to 1 million people will have doubled from today. now rapid organization, of course, was it's own social and security implications. we can talk about those more in the q & a.

i think we should consider the violence which is closely not only to sort of pluralistic population, but also business interest, drug trafficking, and those settings and things like that. now the sort of shift a little bit to joshua's comments about political islam. i do feel that -- i agree with him that the extremist are not going to come into power and ruin the parties any time soon. i also agree with him that distinctions between moderate and extremist lam -- extreme islam, are not helpful. we will see a shift in the pakistani ideology, across social economic crosses. i believe this will take the shape of hatened popularization of what right is considered extremist rhetoric. i believe there are many factors that can contribute to this.

first one is there are a variety of military operations both foreign and local that bo provide the marketplace of the options whether they are into u.s., india, anti-minority, and they have varying degrees of affiliation with taliban and al qaeda. the person unemployed and food insecure will easily be able to find groups that have a similar sort of ideological positions and often some sort of nuance that is appealing. with 20 million internet subscribers and internet in pakistan, the ability to internet is increasing and multiplying. there's also the fact that i'm sure we'll get in the course of this afternoon the state of education in pakistan, and i think many of the people in this room know that pakistan has a

sort of schizophrenic school system that's public and private. and that all of these systems are producing students with different world views. what i do think is worth noting, each of these has currently put in price a kind of curriculum that does promote islam, islamic values and that kind of society in pakistan as the country under tread and islam under threat and using the idea that islam will be the solution of many of the country's problems. i do sort of wonder about the situation in the future the one things of the products of the three school systems have in common is the heightened religiosity, and one that sort of can be exploited by extremist organizations are more likely to sort of come to public narrative, and conversations in

the public too. finally, the role being played by pakistan recently privatized by the media. electronic media, in mostly televisions and radio stations. in less than a decade, we have gone from two to 90 television stations. and since the islamabad in 2001, these channels have been increasely willing and open to broadcasting views of radical religious leaders and extremist organizations. there's been much mention of the aftermath of the governor's assassination, and many in the pakistan are beginning to blame the meet ya -- blame the media for the support. they have hotted and interviewed extensively before and after the event. you also see the media in an effort to boost ratings, and

generally exacerbating the failed enemy. bill touched on the black swan in the event of the u.s. or india, we will certainly expect the media in extremist rhetoric. one final quick point i'll take, we should acknowledge the changing nature of pakistan in politics. i think it'll be debated in the source of this afternoon whether they are in for more and military dictatorships and they are going to have a chance given the army does not for once have a government in waiting, and also because no one wants to take the job right now like we've seen in the last couple of weeks. we are moving towards a more decentralized government thanks to the ambassadors 18th amendment. which we can talk about later. we will theorize on ethnic and

political parties. there's an idea for more providences, increase in coalition politics, and these i argue, would be more fashionized, and all trends of politics and a continuing culture of political patronage. this has already been touched on already. i believe without -- as people struggle more to stay in power for stronger, there will be a lack of long term strategizing, less of a willingness to implement reforms and the policies that are required to express the development. and i will wrap up and i'm looking forward to the discussion. >> thank you, huma. and thank you to bill and josh. i thank a very impressive discussion. you've touched on so many issues. my job was really to be the mop

up person at the end and touch on some of the issue that is were not addressed. i think we did a fairly good job in touching most of the most important issues. i might just add one that i don't think was mentioned. and that was sex. not from the audience. huma pointed out in terms of number, but the demographic in terms of the youth bulge, she mentioned i'd like to emphasis. you see different statistics. sometimes 60% of the population under 30, sometimes 75%. half of them men. young men teenagers. young adults. when i talk about sex, i'm talking about hormones. all of that testosterone makes for the population that's resales.

i'm not picking on pakistan. the baby boomers, remember the '60s and '70s, we were a pretty obstructive group ourselves. the icons -- we assassinated our icons. bob kennedy, john kennedy, john lennon, our groups were the weather man and sds, cities burned in the united states. it was a violent period. and i don't think we can discount that the nature of the population leads for a very ask rad population. the second point that i think was that i thought of to speak to you, i think was very well covered. that is the political islam. but i'd couch is a little bit differently. in terms of the civil war, going on in pakistan, over values. the values of the idea of

pakistan as bill -- as steve wrote in his book of the muhammad ali vision. ruled under the constitution, largely laws that had their roots in the british system is now being challenged. several the speakers mentioned the assassination of sal tashir. it's the ability to provide for the poor, the security agencies responsibility to provide for security for all people that have evidently not for minorities with just one the ugly truths that we saw with the assassination.

pointing out as the economic issues get worse, it's the poor and the investments in the population that get shortchanged. and these -- this issues i believe call the civil war values in pakistan. that will be an important element that's going to shape it's future. my final point before we open up for discussion. i don't think this was emphasized enough. that is the demonization of the united states. we certainly see ourselves as a very good friend of pakistan. yet we have a important of government and army that we are close to but a society who has almost declared war. popular resentment is eroding

the common ground we'd like to plant our feet. it makes it difficult for the humanitarian workers to distribute this, now that we have the developmental assistance passed by the congress. it makes it dangerous for american diplomats in cities. we've had this tragic event with david in lahore, and it makes -- to that i'd like to say it makes it difficult for us to resolve our diplomatic problems. you had 40,000 people in the streets in lahore on sunday burning effigies of david in the united states. this is what kind of relationship we're able to have. i don't believe that anybody in the pakistan government nor the united states government wants anything less than good relations. but we are fighting some very powerful forces there that i think it's time that we talk about a little bit more openly

when we talk about where our diplomatic relations are going in the future. and i hope that we can do that very openly and candidly this afternoon. what i'd like to suggest as we take questions is that you -- we have cameras and we have microphones. so please wait until you are given the microphone before you begin your question. if you could identify yourself, it would be helpful to all of us. sorry, the microphones are here. perhaps if you could line us behind the microphone on both sides of the room. that'll make it a lot easier for me selecting who gets to go first. trudy -- i'm sorry. chris. >> i do have a question. >> you have to speak into the microphone. >> my name is christine fair. i have a couple of comments and questions. i was concerned with huma's

characterization of poverty, lack of education, and so forth as driving this transaction towards militancy. the interest thing is there's no evidence for that. jacob and my other colleagues have done a lot of polling on this. we actually find, here's something that might be startling, it's the wealthier and better educated people that are most attracted to al qaeda. that makes sense. they are the ones that are most familiar. the problem with saying these factors contribute to militancy, there's no evidence. it maybe promote the u.s. government to go down pathways that are not useful. going back to the issue of what a utterly useful. i was there during the assassination. friends of mine who are chronic scholars, they are outaged because it's not consistent with the koran. here you have a country that

claims to be an islamic state, the vast majority, i mean the absolute vast majority have no actual ability to read and comprehend the koran. and the u.s. is pursuing the secularization campaign, maybe something else is needed. maybe if pakistan wants to be a state, it has a requirement that they know what it means to be muslim. because people are inconsistent with koran are afraid, or other folks that might be in the environment won't understand the nature. we might want to reconsider that's actually driving this. >> thank you, chris. we welcome others who'd like to react to chris' comments that would like to join us at the microphone. >> next. ready? >> my name is arnold zeitland.

i opened the first bureau in pakistan in 1969, and have been following roles since. i come back from china since 2009, and has been in washington since then. there's one interest group that i find ignored or hardly ever mentioned. i would like to read something to you and appreciate if you think it has any slidty. -- validity. what i'm talking about the bureaucracy in pakistan. the statement that i would like to show you and read to you will determine if it has any validity is the bureaucracy of pakistan is self-serving, dedicated to it's survival, and continuation, using inept civilian and the government and hubris of the military to make it's supreme. does that have any validity?

that's my question. >> uh-huh. anybody on the panel like to address that? >> let me start by responding to your comment which is to clarify where i'm coming from. i agree with you. i know there's the neat thing if the boy doesn't get the job in the fife months, he turns out joins the extremist organization. there's a willingness not only to bring religious rhetoric to the table, but also to come at it from the social justice angle. looking forward, assuming other factors like the one that jack what -- that joshua mentioned, supporting the government, and recruit becomes more systemic. this would be a factor that would contribute to people joining the groups. i think if that happening, what membership of an extremist organization looks like will be different. it could be much more casual,

less violent. what i do think i was trying to get at, looking at it from the outside, there's the rightward movement will be pakistani society. it doesn't mean that everyone is becomes militant or taliban foothold. it just means it's increased in islam, and what it means to be islamist. and this is religious terms. one the league productive we can continue like the secular. i think the u.s. needs to reconsider. it's been coming up for the last few months. with ready to deal with the pakistan? it's a much more pakistan, when everyone isn't having whiskey when they are talking about the islamic republic. i think that's the new pakistan that everyone was engaging with. that's what i'm trying to get it, the nuances are much more in

the middle and it's moving right. just to clarify my comment. >> i think chris raised a terrific point. we often think about the public schools in pakistan as being secular because that's our american model. but pretty much anybody who goes to school in pakistan almost anywhere will study islamyat which is a mix of islam and pakistani nationalist. i think if we want -- if pakistanis want to have a society in which young people can think about which -- about what issues are actually in accordance with the koran and sudan. they need to translate more or less as godless, which don't go over very well to pakistaniers. i've never received a question

about the pakistani bureaucracy. i think it's fantastic. pakistani bureaucracy, i think, is a self-serving institution. all bureaucracies are by definition. i think it has done a good job of surviving. you ask any pakistani what they think of the bureaucracy, they'll have stories of utterly corrupt, and stories of incredibly competent, impressive bureaucratic officers as well. i've met the full spectrum. look at the issue of economy. these days the bureaucrats and the finance ministry and elsewhere, many of them are doing their darnest to get the government to realize the problem, the problems that the country faces and the fiscal solutions that are available. and so at times bureaucrats do a tremendous effective work, and at times, of course, they've been part of the problem. i don't think that's different from anymore anywhere else. in terms of the impact on the future of pakistan, i'm not sure

it would be a decisive factor. in many ways, pakistan inherited and has kept many of the british ways of operating the pure rack -- bureaucracy, and we've seen in natural disasters, the bureaucracy has done a pretty good job. >> trudy rubin, "the philadelphia inquirer." josh, you spoke about the government what is the response to vigilante islamist given the contract? i guess my question is given what huma said about the increased religiosity, and given what we saw in the aftermath of the assassination, where do you see any groups whether it is governmental, whether it is nongovernmental, whether it is tie up in the military or

anywhere else in society that is willing to take on the issue of vigilante. islam is publicly if we mean by vigilante islamism, the murder of and assassination of people who people out and even the question of mumbai which general pasha games he didn't know about, perhaps he didn't and others did. who in pakistani society is willing to take on any of that from the domestic even to the international at this point in time? and if i could add to that question, very similar question that came from the overspill rule, on individual -- vigilante islam, how does it play into

islam, and what is their source of power? >> i think those are great questions. you are right to observe that. there are not many people who will speak up in public against these kind of vigilante activities. but certainly there are some. if you are -- there are some members of political parties who will say regardless of what you think of blasphemy, these are things that one can't do by one's own hand. a lot of these debates are not happening within public, they are happening within the political party and military and other places. i know i've talked to quite a few members of the islamist political parties who are actually having these debates within their parties and have over the last several years. having the debates over the red mosque and the position is well, of course, we think that he

committed blasphemy. but who's job is it to rectify that? many of the islamist parties who we think would be for people taking this into their own hands are actually afraid of the follow on effects of society or a political environment in which people take these things into their own hands. and part -- they are afraid of this because they are worried that other groups, other taliban-like groups will consider them to be political sellouts and will target them. this doesn't service into the public debate. it does to some extent. some members of the political parties will come out and say we have to draw a line here. within political parties, there's actually often quite a robust debate about not the ultimate objective, but about the method by which this should be carried out. and i -- you know, again, i've had senior clerics say to me, of

course, if somebody steals his hand should be cut off. i can't cut off his hand. the government has to cut off his hand. now from one frame, the person who says i can't cut off his hand has a more moderate position. i'm not going to call it a moderate. but this is an important dividing line between those who say the government has a role. and that's an important debate to watch. especially as it doubles up from within political parties and other groups. >> can i follow up on that? >> sure. >> if the debate is internal within the parties, you were talking about government. is there then no instrument of power, meaning government or military, that has power to do something that is willing to take this on? and if it's a silent, private debate, two fearful to come out in the open, then is there any mechanism to fight back against

vigilante islamist? >> i think it can come out. the question was is there any institutions that has the strength to take this on? i think think think -- there wi. it's a matter of political leadership, and the members of the political parties can say regardless of what you think of somebody's stated views, we have a legal mechanism in this country. we have civil law and islamist law and things have to be followed in the manner. that's a manner of political will and the military is a strong institution and the bureaucracy and others. i'd be interested on this as well. i don't think it's a hopeful case. i think it comes down to political leadership. it's understandable why the issues don't bubble up into public discourse. because are understandably afraid of what will happen if this happens openly. although every once in a while on the tv, you see some pretty intense debates about blasphemy

about how the government should respond to the taliban and the legitimacy of ad hoc quasi courts set up. these things do come up as part of the public debate. not that it's not there. >> i will add two things. you can see the conversation in the media. especially after the assassination, a lot of people noted the one religious clerk, highly regarded, now in fear for his life in exile. he could do it because he's out of the country. the fact is his voice was on air. everyone will hear the side of the story. there's a movement in better media regulation. if that kicks in, you'll see more balanced debate. the other thing that's interesting is civil society organizations are becoming a bit savvier. they have realized they are u.s.-dollar funding as put a taint on their work.

they are realizing very quickly the steep learning curve and the secular groups of not being useful and alienating themselves. what they are doing is appealing to the independents. i think you see civil society groups taking to the streets and doing candle light vigils and things, asking for the supreme court justice. i agree with joshua. i think that as long as people start getting a better understanding off of the bureaucracy and system and pressurize which they are learning in comes years, we may see a few where the government is the force to take action according to the law. >> can i say something? >> sure. please. >> thank you. this question, strikes me. i've raised this before. as really sort of a general question of somehow the formation of a counternarrative to what i would call the islamist narrative, which would be, i think, in the -- should be

in the hands of the government whenever government is in power. and supported by the military. and there's where i think and, you know, this should work it's way through the schools and so forth. there's where i don't think i see much signs of progress in pakistan. and i don't know exactly -- i mean i thought that the aftermath of the assassination. i think the democracy has changed. it was much more hand and glove with the military rulers of the time. i wasn't there. that's my reading of history. i don't think that's the case anymore. however, i agree with josh particularly in some of the key ministries like finance, there are some really good technical

economist, technical people who know what should be done. it's the political will to do it that is not there. >> yeah. thank you very much. i work for lives of america, in the region service. our broadcast is called diva radio. many questions flooded my mind. due to time restrictions, i understand i have to ask one question. my question is in terms of war, the islamist might be receiving in any parliamentary election just 10 to 15%. but keeping the episode of the killing of the top guy in pakistan would be that they extremist have hijacked the moderate pakistanis, and as a followup, nobody, the single

politician will openly condemn quad re. the second question is if i have not heard the letter, the pakistani media wrote in all of this, it has become a pressure group that's operating in the hand of rightist people. that's not what i am saying one the pakistani ruling collision party member for yesterday. how do you see the role of media in all of this? and probably i think also that the point in the discussion was missing that islamist don't operation in isolation. they are not some organic creatures. who is supporting them? my question is specific is how the pakistani army has changed or not. it was the one skeptical of

keeping the country holding it together or picking it? thank you very much. >> i'll take the question about the media since i've touched on that. i certainly think they are playing a big role in sort of heightening the sense of political instability and crisis. i have talked a bit about how they are increasingly willing for the drama value than any sinister reason to give undue amounts of their time to extremist viewpoints. i think they have learned a bit of the lesson from the aftermath of the assassination. there was a need for self-correction. you saw a lot of media issue retraction and had both sides of the story represented. the industry is only 80 years old.